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There is a natural conflict between copyright law and anti-trust law, in that the 
fonner tries to provide and promote the exclusive right to a limited monopoly the latter 
tries to prevent. According to the Copyright Clause (Art I, § 8(8)) of the U.S. 
Constitution "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."! This exclusive right grants to authors a 
limited monopoly over their works of authorship for a limited amount of time that may be 
exploited according to the authors' discretion pursuant of the provisions of the U.S. 
Copyright Act (17 U.S.c.). It works to encourage creativity, and also, to induce 
competition among authors for "the most original" expression in arts and science. 
Anti-trust law, on the other hand, reflects an express policy against monopolies. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (hereinafter, the "Sherman Act") provides that 
"Every contract, combination in the fonn of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby 
declared to be illegal.,,2 And Section 2 of the Sherman Act states even more clearly that 
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
1 For the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution in general, see Joseph C. Merschrnan, Anchoring 
Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run around Limits on 
Congress's Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REv. 661 (2002); Kevin D. Galbraith, Forever on the 
Installment Plan? An Examination of the Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders' Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119 (2002); Andrew M. Hetherington, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause 
Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. 
REv. 457 (2003); also Noel L. Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of the 
Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. EMI, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 733, 735 (1998). 
2 For Section 1 of the Sherman Act, see, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962); Eastern Coal 
Corp. v. Disabled Miners Association, 449 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1971); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental 
Association, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977). 
1 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ... ,,3 
Anti-trust law's main purpose is to protect the competitive process through economic 
efficiency and competition in a free market system in order to encourage product 
development and lower product prices.4 The framers of the Constitution abhorred 
monopolies as well, but felt that granting a limited monopoly to authors and inventors for 
their respective writings and discoveries was a fair trade for disclosure and publication. 
The conflict between copyright law and anti-trust law intensifies in the area of 
public performance rights and in particular, the licensing of musical works. Copyright 
owners of musical works generally pool ("monopolize") their public performance rights 
over their creative expressions in performing rights societies (PRSs) in order to 
strengthen the enforcement of these rights. These societies are designed to act as agents 
on their members' behalf. They enforce their members' exclusive public performance 
rights, collect public performance royalties from music users like TV or radio stations, 
monitor and control these entities' performance activities, and distribute the collected 
performance monies to their members according to a pre-determined scheme. These 
activities, which are consistent with the U.S. Copyright Act would seem to violate 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in that they form a "contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" (Section 1) 
3 For Section 2 of the Sherman Act, see in particular Gordon B. Spivack, Antitrust Developments: 
Monopolization under Sherman Act, Section 2, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 285 (1981); Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust 
at the Millenium (Part I): Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 87 (2000). 
4 See in particular PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION - PART ONE - CHAPTER 1 - THE OBJECTIVES OF 
ANTITRUST LAW (2001). 
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and/or "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce" (Section 2). 
The two legal areas must be harmonized in order to avoid the situation that would 
arise if the U.S. Constitution tried to promote and secure something unlawful. Attempts 
at harmonizing the two legal areas must start with the U.S. Supreme Court's restriction of 
the broad language of the Sherman Act by integrating the rule of reasons into the legal 
discussion: the Sherman Act shall be applied only to such business conduct that 
constitutes an "undue" or "unreasonable" restraint of trade. 6 Reasonable market behavior 
that on balance7 does not hamper economic efficiency and competition in the free market 
must on the other hand be tolerated, even encouraged. Under this premise, anti-trust law 
would not contradict the Copyright Clause; instead, it would only set limits on 
unreasonable market behavior by copyright owners. 
Some categories of business practices, however, are deemed by the courts to be 
illegal per se. As such, a balancing test containing an elaborate comparison of all 
circumstances and factors relating to the individual case is unnecessary because the anti-
competitive business practices in the particular case "lack ... any redeeming virtue.,,8 
5 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911); also California Dental Association v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); In re Detroit Auto Dealers Association, 955 F.2d 457,469-72 (6th Cir. 1992); 
also Andrew I. Gavil, The Future Course of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 331 (2000). 
6 Id. 
7 In re Detroit Auto Dealers Association, 955 F.2d 457,469 (6th Cir. 1992) mentions the following factors 
to be included in a balancing test: facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable; the history of the restraint; the evil believed to exist; the reason for adopting the particular 
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained. See also American Ad Management v. GTE Corp., 92 
F.3d 781,791 (9th Cir. 1996); also Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 5. 
8 See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958): "There are certain agreements or 
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise 
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Cited from id. at 5. See also HERBERT 
HOYENKAMP, ANTITRUST 90 (3rd ed. 1999). 
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The per se rule9 developed out of a judicial need for time-saving mechanisms in "plainly 
anti-competitive"IO cases. In cases in which the court has repeatedly dealt with certain 
business practices that it views as plainly or manifestly anti-competitive, the court need 
not duplicate previous in-depth economic investigations of the business practice's 
economic effects and the history of the relevant market to determine illegality. II Such 
business practices include, for example, price fixing,12 resale price maintenance,13 and 
tying agreements. 14 
This article will explore the question how anti-trust law affects the PRSs' practice 
of licensing public performance rights of musical works into audiovisual media. It will, 
first, set forth the historical development and necessity of PRSs (under II); secondly, 
define and explain the different types and forms of licensing public performance rights 
(under III); and, thirdly, analyze in detail the historical attempts by the government and 
by private parties to enforce anti-trust law, in particular Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, against the PRSs' system of blanket licensing musical works into audiovisual media 
(under IV). 
9 See Mary Katherine Kennedy, Blanket Licensing of Music Performing Rights: Possible Solutions to the 
Copyright-Antitrust Conflict, 37 VAND. L. REv. 183, 187 (1984); also HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 90. 
10 Cited from National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). See 
also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977): "Per se rules of illegality are 
appropriate ... when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." !d. at 49-50. 
11 See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 187. 
12 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); also Jonathan B. Baker, 
Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996); Phillip 
Areeda, Antitrust in Transition: Crossing the Threshold of Change: The Changing Contours of the Per Se 
Rule, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 27 (1985); HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 91. 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
14 See, e.g., International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Tying agreements refer to 
cases, in which the seller of product A conditions the sale of product A to a buyer on the buyer's purchase 
of product B, i.e., the buyer must purchase the perhaps unwanted product B in order to acquire the desired 
product A. See in general HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 148-51. 
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II. Historical Development and Necessity of Performing Rights 
Societies (PRSs) 
A.ASCAP 
The exclusive right to publicly perform a copyrighted musical work was granted 
to a copyright owner by the Copyright Act on January 6, 1897.15 The right covered at the 
beginning only public "live" performances, mainly in clubs, dance halls, cabarets, 
gatherings, or theaters. 16 In 1914, it became evident that an individual copyright owner 
could not reasonably negotiate public performance licenses with all possible users of 
music on an individual basis throughout the country.17 Moreover, all those who wished 
to publicly perform musical compositions, planned or spontaneously, without infringing 
15 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, chapter 4,29 Stat. 481 (1897). It said (excerpt): "Any person publicly performing or 
representing any dramatic or musical composition for which a copyright has been obtained, without the 
consent of the proprietor of said dramatic or musical composition, or his heirs or assigns, shall be liable for 
damages therefore, such damages in all cases to be assessed at such sum, as to the court shall appear to be 
just. If the unlawful performance and representation be willful and for profit, such person or persons shall 
be gUilty of a misdemeanor." Since 1897, the Copyright Act has been amended several times. Today, the 
public performance right is contained in Section 1 06 of the Copyright Act. For a current definition of the 
term "public performance" as provided in Section 101 of the Copyright Act, see the glossary. A copyright 
owner has several other exclusive rights pursuant to Section 106 of the Copyright Act, such as the right to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work, and to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public. The 
right to publicly perform a copyrighted work is the focus of this paper. 
16 See, e.g., M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINITIVE 
GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 133 (9th ed. 2003); also Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 
891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
17 For the necessity of PRSs in general, see KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16: "There would be 
endless searches and bargaining for performing rights involving the owners of both established and obscure 
songs." Cited from id. at 134-35. See also BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4-5, 10, 14-15, 20-21 (1979) 
("thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility;" cited from id. at 20); Buffalo Broadcasting 
Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("impossible for individual composers and 
publishers to negotiate licenses with each user and to detect unauthorized uses;" cited from id. at 277); 
National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614,617 (D.C. 1991). See also Hillman, 
supra note 1, at 740-41; Joseph P. Escalante, ASCAP, BM!, and the Sherman Act: Are Today's Top-Stars in 
Bed with the Blanket License?, 22 W. ST. U.L. REv. 75, 79 (1994); Nora Miles, Pop Goes Commercial: 
The Evolution of the Relationship between Popular Music and Television Commercials, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. 
& PRAC. 121, 124 (2003); Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral Rights 
for Music: A Need in the Current u.s. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide Moral Rights, 10 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (2001). 
5 
the various copyright owners' copyrights could not, as a practical matter, obtain licenses 
in advance for all the musical works from each and every copyright owner.18 To fill this 
void, Victor Herbertl9 and other famous music composers and music publishers formed 
the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (AS CAP) in order to pool 
their musical compositions for bundled sales to music users. This meant that ASCAP 
offered a blanket license to music users in exchange for a one time, flat fee that allowed 
licensees to publicly perform any and all musical works contained in the ASCAP 
repertory at any time during the license term upon their choosing. At that time, ASCAP 
membership agreements required that copyright owners grant exclusive licenses of their 
public performance rights to ASCAP, which meant that music users had to acquire a 
blanket license from ASCAP if they wanted to publicly perform musical works contained 
in the ASCAP catalogue. This was the genesis of ASCAP's anti-competitive behavior. 
ASCAP's exclusive licensing requirement excluded any form of competition with 
musical works of its own members. Governmental anti-trust court actions stemming 
from the 1930s later led to consent decrees that required ASCAP to change its 
membership agreements in this respect. From that moment on, ASCAP was allowed to 
obtain public performance licenses from its members only on a non-exclusive basis. We 
will discuss these developments in further detail in chapter IV.A. 
Today, ASCAP represents over 200,000 U.S. music composers, songwriters, 
lyricists, and music publishers of every kind of music.20 Through agreements with 
affiliated foreign PRSs, ASCAP also represents hundreds of thousands of music 
18 !d. 
19 See for further details http://www.pdmusic.orglherbert.html (last visited May 29,2005). 
20 See http://www.ascap.com!aboutlhistory/ (last visited May 29, 2005); also KRASlLOVSKY & SHEMEL, 
supra note 16, at 136. 
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composers and publishers worldwide?l As of this writing, its catalogue consists of more 
than 8 million musical works. 
B.BMI 
In ASCAP's early days, music composers had to qualify for membership in 
ASCAP by having at least five hit songs published. On a case by case basis, in its 
discretion, ASCAP itself decided in which cases this requirement was fulfilled. This 
requirement excluded most new artists from ASCAP's services and favored only a 
relatively small body of already established writers?2 Likewise, the ASCAP membership 
policies favored only music publishers who had already established themselves on the 
market. 23 Since AS CAP was the only PRS at the time, its member publishers and 
composers had significant influence over who could profit by writing music for public 
performances. At the saine time, ASCAP exercised, due to its exclusive licensing power 
over its members' public performance rights, tremendous leverage in setting conditions 
for licensing all forms of music users.24 
In 1939, a number of radio broadcasters felt frustrated by the ASCAP conditions 
and decided that ASCAP's latest demands for a 100% increase in license fees over the 
previous year25 and its continuing limitations on membership enrollment could not longer 
be tolerated.26 As a result, the radio broadcasters formed their own PRS, Broadcast 
21 See http://www.ascap.comiaboutlhistory/ (last visited May 29,2005). 
22 See Television Music License Committee, The History of Television Music Performance Rights (last 
visited May 29, 2005) <http://www.televisionmusic.comihistoryprint.html>; BMI, A Creative Alternative 
(last visited May 29, 2005) <http://www.bmi.comilibrary/brochures/historybook/creative.asp>. 
23 Id. 
24 !d. 
25 See BMI, supra note 22. 
26 See Jay M. Fujitani, Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Societies: an Administrative 










Music Inc. (BMI), which offered music composers and music publishers open enrollment 
independent of their success and status.27 BMI's formation had two purposes: first, to 
provide radio broadcasters and other music users with an alternative source from which 
to obtain a license for public performance rights; and second, to provide an opportunity 
for those songwriters and music publishers who were either unable to gain entry into 
ASCAP or unhappy with ASCAP terms, to share in performing rights income for their 
publicly performed musical works.28 Over the years, BMI has built up its own alternative 
catalogue of musical works, today representing more than 300,000 songwriters, 
composers and music publishers in all genres ofmusic.29 Today, its repertoire consists of 
more than 6.5 million compositions. Like ASCAP, it is affiliated with all major foreign 
PRSs, representing hundreds of thousands of their members on the U.S. market.3o 
C. SESAC 
SESAC, another PRS, was formed in 1930 under the name Society of European 
Stage, Authors and Composers. Its repertory was at the beginning limited to European 
music,3! but today because of its openness to all kinds and genres of national and 
international music it prefers to call itself only SESAC.32 Currently, SESAC represents 
COmmittee, supra note 22; also Gerald F. Phillips, Five Cases that Shook Hollywood, 25 Los ANGELES 
LAWYER 35, 40 (2002); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 184. 
27 See Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. 
28 See the references in note 25; also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 137. 
29 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 137; BMI, The BM! Backgrounder (last visited May 29, 
2005) <http://www.bmi.comlaboutlbackgrounder.asp>. 
30 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 149-51; also Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 
546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 
614,617 n.3 (D.C. 1991). 
31 See http://www.sesac.comlaboutsesac/about.html (last visited May 29, 2005); also Phillips, supra note 
26, at 40; SCHULENBERG, supra note 34, at 8,369. 
32 Their original full name is nowhere mentioned on SESAC's official Web Site (www.sesac.com). See 




about 8,000 songwriters and music publishers, about 2% of all public performance rights 
on the market. 33 
Today, AS CAP and BMI are the two leading PRSs in the United States. Both 
represent their members on a break-even basis, distributing all collected performance 
monies to their members after deducting only administrative costS.34 SESAC, instead, 
represents its members on a for-profit basis.35 SESAC employs a selective enrollment 
policy by which it seeks to affiliate only financially promising new songwriters and 
music publishers.36 In exchange, SESAC offers a more personal relationship between its 
creative staff and its members so as to better develop their members' talents and 
abilities.37 SESAC substantially increased its status when Bob Dylan38 and Neil 
Diamond39 switched their writer and publisher catalogues in 1994 (Dylan) and 1995 
(Diamond) from ASCAP to SESAC.40 
33 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 133, 137; PASSMAN, supra note 39, at 219. 
34 See only KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 136-37. 
35 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 137-38. 
36 See http://www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/about.htmi(last visited May 29, 2005); also KRASILOVSKY & 
SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 137-38. 
37 See http://www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/about.htmi(last visited May 29, 2005). SESAC also employs a 
different license fee and distribution system. See also RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
MUSIC INDUSTRY: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS 
369 (1999). 
38 URL: www.bobdylan.com. 
39 URL: www.neildiamond.com. 
40 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 138. 
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III. Types of Public Performance Rights Licenses 
A. Types of Public Performance Rights Licenses granted by the PRSs 
1. Blanket license 
A blanket license typically grants the licensee, for example a TV station or the 
operator of an Internet website, the non-exclusive right to publicly perform any or all of 
the nondramatic musical works contained in the entire repertory of a PRS, in all or parts 
of its programs, and as often as the licensee wants.41 In other words, a blanket license 
gives the licensee permission to use the entire catalogue of musical works that have been 
licensed to the PRS.42 The repertory43 of ASCAP consists, for example, of all 
copyrighted musical works written and published by ASCAP members or by the 
members of ASCAP affiliated foreign PRSs. 
The PRSs offer the blanket license to reduce transaction costs, prevent unwanted 
and unforeseen copyright infringements by their licensees, and provide broadcasters with 
41 See, e.g., the "Grant of License" clause in the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT 
FOR INTERACTIVE SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 2.0 (last visited May 29, 2005) <http:// 
www.ascap.com/weblicense/release2.0.pdf>. or the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT 
FOR INTERNET SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 5.0 (last visited May 29, 2005) <http:// 
www.ascap.com/weblicense/release5.0.pdf>. See also the "GRANT OF RIGHTS" clause in the BMI Local 
Television Station Music Performance Blanket License Agreement (last visited May 29, 2005) <http:// 
www.bmi.com/licensing/forms/local tv blanket.pdf>. See also KRASlLOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, 
at 136-38; Connie C. Davis, Copyright and Antitrust: The Effects of the Digital Performance Rights in 
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 in Foreign Markets, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 417 (2000); Escalante, supra 
note 17, at 79-80; Miles, supra note 17, at 124-25; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 184-85; Hillman, supra note 
1, at 741-42; also CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,5-6 
(1979); Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. AS CAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Cable 
Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614,617 (D.C. 1991). A comprehensive analysis of the 
necessity and advantages of blanket licensing from a macro-economic perspective is set forth by Fujitani, 
supra note 26, at 107-13. 
42 See PASSMAN, supra note 39, at 220. 
43 See, e.g., the definition of this term in Section 3.(d) of the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE 
AGREEMENT FOR INTERNET SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 5.0, supra note 41, or in Section 3.(d) 
of the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR INTERACTIVE SITES & SERVICES-





a large number of musical options for all or parts of their pro grams. 44 AS CAP grants its 
blanket license until December 31 of the year in which the license was executed, and 
continues after that on a year-to-year basis unless the blanket license agreement is 
terminated at least thirty days prior to the end ofa calendar year,45 by one of the parties.46 
According to the wholesale character of the blanket license, the PRSs do not base their 
license fees on the extent of music/repertory use by the licensee during the term of its 
blanket license agreement, but on the licensee's gross receipts47 or other market factors,48 
minus certain adjustments, such as agency commissions and wire charges.49 
Blanket license agreements for local broadcast TV stations have become 
extensively standardized over the years. This standardization is the result of years of 
negotiations between the Television Music Licensing Committ~e (TMLC) on one side, 
and ASCAP, BMI and SESAC on the other side. The TMLC represents local TV stations 
in music licensing matters and negotiates licenses on behalf of the local TV industry with 
the PRSs. In addition, the National Cable Television Association (NCTA)5o has 
negotiated separately with AS CAP, BMI, and SESAC to obtain standard blanket license 
44 For the necessity and advantages of blanket licensing, see in particular Fujitani, supra note 26, at 107-13 
(using a macro-economic perspective). 
45 See the "Term of License" clause in Section 5 of the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE 
AGREEMENT FOR INTERNET SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 5.0, supra note 41. 
46 Id.; also Section 5 of the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR INTERACTIVE 
SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 2.0, supra note 41. 
47 This is the current practice of ASCAP and BML See under http://www.ascap.comllicensing/tvfaq.html; 
http://www.bmi.com/licensinglbroadcaster/tv/tvfaq.asp (both last visited May 29, 2005). See also 
KRASlLOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 136-37; CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972); BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979); Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.C. 
1991). 
48 Unlike ASCAP and BMI, SESAC bases its determination of each licensee's license fee rate not on each 
licensee's gross receipts, but on other market factors, such as market population served by each licensee 
and each licensee's standard advertising rates. See under http://www.sesac.comllicensing/broadcast 
licensing faq.htmI#sesacL (last visited May 29,2005). See also KRASlLOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, 
at 137-38; SCHULENBERG, supra note 34, at 369. 
49 See in general Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in 
Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & Arts 349,353 (2001); Davis, supra note 41, at 417. 













agreements for local cable TV system operators who use the PRSs' music repertory in 
locally originated programming and advertising. 51 The three major TV networks ABC, 
CBS and NBC as well as the PBS network have all negotiated blanket license agreements 
with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC for their network programming. In contrast, the Fox, 
WB, UPN or PAX TV networks have never elected to acquire network licenses for their 
affiliates with ASCAP, BMI or SESAC. Instead, affiliates of these networks, in 
particular affiliated local broadcast TV stations, remain individually responsible for 
obtaining public performance licenses from PRSs to use the music in all of their 
programming, including their network programming. 52 In addition to the "old media" 
licenses, downloadable standard "new media" blanket license agreements have recently 
been added by ASCAP and BMI to their online catalogues. 53 AS CAP currently offers 
experimental blanket License Agreements for Internet and Interactive Sites & Services;54 
BMI offers a Web Site Music Performance Agreement. 55 License fees are based on the 
website operator's gross revenues, further specified In included rate calculation 
schemes. 56 
51 For details, see under http://www.bmi.com/licensing/broadcaster/cable/cablega4.pdf; http://www.ascap. 
comllicensing/tvcablesatellite/index.html; http://www.sesac.com/licensingibroadcast licensing fag.html# 
sesacI (all last visited May 29, 2005). 
52 See Television Music License Conunittee, supra note 22; also United States v. ASCAP, 870 F. Supp. 
1211, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
53 See http://www.ascap.comlweblicense/ and http://www.bmi.comllicensinglwebcaster/ (both last visited 
May 29,2005). 
54 See the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR INTERNET SITES & SERVICES-
RELEASE 5.0, supra note 41, and the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR 
INTERACTIVE SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 2.0, supra note 41. See also the ASCAP 
EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR WIRELESS MUSIC SERVICES - Release 3.0 (last 
visited May 29, 2005) <http://www.ascap.comlweblicense/release3.0.pdt> that provides a license to 
services that offer "ringtones," "ringbacks" and other music related products and services to consumers and 
other wireless music distributors. 
55 See the BMI WEBSITE MUSIC PERFORMANCE AGREEMENT (last visited May 29, 2005) <http:// 
www.bmi.comllicensing/forms/lntemetO 1 05 A. pdt>. 
56 See, e.g., id. Sections 4 and 5, or Section 7 of the ASCAP EXPERIMENTAL LICENSE AGREEMENT 
FOR INTERACTIVE SITES & SERVICES - RELEASE 2.0, supra note 41. 
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2. Per-program license 
A per-program license grants the licensee the non-exclusive right to publicly 
perform any or all of the nondramatic musical works contained in the entire repertory of a 
PRS in certain programs as often as the licensee wants.57 It is similar to a blanket license 
in that it authorizes the licensee to use all of the musical works in the entire repertory of a 
PRS. It differs, however, from the blanket license in that the music repertory of the PRS 
may be used only in certain programs that are identified in the language of the per-
program license. The per-program license fee is determined in part by the nature and 
frequency of the music used in those programs and the amount of gross revenue 
generated by those programs, in particular advertising revenue for the licensee. 58 This 
leads generally to lower licensing cost for licensees who use music only in a limited 
number of their programs. However, a per-program license entails an obligation for each 
licensee to keep track of all musical works used in broadcast programs covered by the 
per-program license and to report the music content and gross revenues associated 
therewith electronicalll9 to the relevant PRS on a monthly basis.6o This monthly 
57 Section II(J) of the Second Amended Final Judgment (AFJ2) (last visited May 29, 2005) <www.ascap. 
com/reference/ascapafj2.pdf or www.usdoLgov/atr/cases/f6300/6396.htm> defines a per-program license as 
"a non-exclusive license that authorizes a broadcaster to perform ASCAP music in all of the broadcaster's 
programs, the fee for which varies depending upon which programs contain ASCAP music not otherwise 
licensed for public performance." For per-program licensing, see also Einhorn, supra note 50, at 354, 355, 
358-59; Hillman, supra note 1, at 742; also CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); CBS 
v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133-34 (2nd Cir. 1977); Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 
274, 282, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 
634-35 (D.C. 1991). 
58 See, e.g., Sections 2.(m) and 5.(a) of the BMI Local Television Station Music Performance Per Program 
License agreement (last visited May 29, 2005) <http://www.bmi.com/licensing/forms/local tv per 
program.pdf>. See also Fujitani, supra note 26, at 105, 114; CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133-34 (2od 
Cir. 1977). 
59 Both ASCAP and BMI accept no paper reports. See http://www.ascap.com/licensing/tvfaq.htmland 
http://www.bmi.com/licensing/broadcaster/tv/tvans2.asp#13 (both last visited May 29,2005). 
60 See, e.g., Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Special 
service firms have evolved that help local TV stations to administer the ASCAP and BMI reporting 
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reporting obligation may be the main reason why currently still 70%61 of all local TV 
stations prefer blanket licenses as opposed to per-program licenses.62 
3. Through-to-the-viewer license 
A through-to-the-viewer license covers two or more public performances by two 
or more different entities. The license is granted to a programming service, for example a 
TV network, that transmits its programming or services to a local TV station (the first 
public performance) which then retransmits the programming or services to the viewers 
(the second public performance).63 "Through-to-the-viewer" blanket licenses have been 
common for network programming on local broadcast TV since 195064 and on local cable 
TV since 1992.65 They are intended to avoid the double or multiple charging of music 
users that would occur if both the service provider and the retransmitting stations were 
each forced to obtain separate blanket licenses for the same programming or services. In 
this respect, "through-to-the-viewer" licenses make per-program licenses for local TV 
stations an attractive, cost saving alternative to the blanket license. Instead of having to 
acquire blanket licenses for their entire programming, including such network programs 
that are already covered by the "through-to-the-viewer" license of their affiliated 
requirements of per-program licenses. The two most prominent of these fIrms are Music Reports, Inc. 
(MRI) <www.musicreports.com>and W.G. Slantz <www.wgsiantz.com>. 
61 See, e.g., http://www.ascap.com/iicensing/tvfaq.html (id. under 9.) (last visited May 29,2005). 
62 Critical of the current concept of per-program licensing Hillman, supra note 1, at 742-43, 745, 757-58. 
See also Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
63 The AFJ2, supra note 57, defInes a through-to-the-audience license in Section lIeS) as "a license that 
authorizes the simultaneous or so-called "delayed" performances of ASCAP music that are contained in 
content transmitted or delivered by a music user to another music user with whom the licensee has an 
economic relationship relating to the content." See also National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. 
BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 622-24 (D.C. 1991); United States v. ASCAP, 870 F. Supp. 1211, 1213-14 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
64 See, e.g., Section YeA) in the Amended Final Judgment (AFJ) (United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 
Trade Cas. (CCH) P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)). 
65 See Peter B. Orlik, Music Licensing (last visited May 29, 2005) <http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/M/ 
htmIM/musiclicensi/musiclicensi.htm>. 
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networks, local TV stations can reduce their licensing costs significantly by spending 
their licensing money only for targeted acquisitions of per-program licenses for their 
uncovered syndicated and locally-produced programming. In accordance with the 
current consent decrees,66 ASCAP and BMI grant through-to-the-viewer licenses in all of 
the above described situations. 
4. Per-use license 
The per-use license is another form of blanket license that avoids the current 
wholesale gross-revenue oriented character of a blanket license by using a license fee that 
is based on: (1) the nature of the copyrighted work and (2) the number of times it is 
actually publicly performed.67 Such a scheme is able to connect the copyright owner's 
compensation needs with the actual use of his musical work by a PRS licensee and thus 
allows for a more accurate, and therefore fairer determination of performance royalty 
payments to composers and music publishers. However, current technology is not yet 
able to detect, recognize, categorize, name, and link every music piece publicly 
performed by a music user on TV or on other media to a specific source. The human 
investigation and reporting efforts of data collection that are required make the per-use 
license system as it is presently offered by ASCAP and BMI68 impracticable and costly.69 
66 See Sections lIeS) and V of the AFJ2, supra note 57, and Articles IX(A) and (B) of the BMI Consent 
Decree, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), as modified in 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 
71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994». 
67 See in general Einhorn, supra note 49, at 354; CBS v. AS CAP, 562 F.2d 130, 134 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1977); 
CBS v. ASCAP, 320 F. Supp. 389, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 397 
n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1972), according to which CBS proposed a different ("library card") per-use license fee 
system. 
68 See Section VI (second sentence) of the AFJ2, supra note 57, and Article IX(A-C) of the BMI Consent 
Decree, supra note 66. 
69 Critical Escalante, supra note 17, at 90-91. See also Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948): "commercially impracticable." Cited from id. at 893. 
15 
5. Summary 
A blanket license typically grants the licensee the non-exclusive right to publicly 
perform any or all of the nondramatic musical works of the entire repertory of a PRS in 
all or parts of its programs as often as the licensee wants. The blanket license fee is 
based on the licensee's gross receipts or other market factors, such as market population 
served by each licensee or each licensee's standard advertising rates, minus certain 
adjustments, such as agency commissions and wire charges. 
A per-program license is another form of blanket license that refers the non-
exclusive right to publicly perform any or all of the nondramatic musical works of the 
entire repertory of a PRS only to certain programs specifically articulated in the language 
of the per-program license. The per-program license fee is determined: (1) by the nature 
and frequency of the music used in those programs and (2) the amount of gross revenue 
generated by those programs. This calculation scheme typically leads to lower licensing 
costs for such licensees that are using music only in a limited number of their programs. 
However, the way in which per-program license fees are determined entails 
administrative burdens for the licensee. Blanket licensing is therefore still the prevalent 
form of licensing public performance rights in musical works. 
A "through-to-the-viewer" license covers two or more public performances of two 
or more different entities. A "through-to-the-viewer" license is typically granted to a 
programming service, for example a TV network, that transmits its programming or 
services to a local TV station (the first public performance) that then retransmits the 
programming or services to the final viewers (the second public performance). Local TV 
stations benefit from a network "through-to-the-viewer" license in that it already covers 
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If 
the broadcasting of their network programs (the second public performance). Instead of 
acquiring blanket licenses for their entire programming, local TV stations may choose to 
acquire per-program licenses only for their non-network programs, despite the general 
administrative burdens connected with per-program licenses. 
A per-use license is another form of blanket license. The music user is allowed to 
use the entire repertory of a PRS, but the PRS charges the music user only for the public 
performance of such copyrighted works that were actually publicly performed by the 
music user. The license fee of the per-use license is based on: (1) the nature of the 
copyrighted work and (2) the number of times the copyrighted work is actually publicly 
performed. The per-use license is the ideal form of licensing public performance rights 
to music users because it can connect the license fee with the actual music use. However, 
limitations of technology make its current implementation impracticable. 
B. Source and Direct Licensing 
Public performance licenses can also be obtained from sources other than the 
PRSs. Consent decrees stemming from litigation and rulemaking in the 1940s require 
that the license grant of the copyright holder of the public performance rights to his PRS 
must be on a non-exclusive basis.70 This means that potential music users can also 
negotiate for a license agreement directly with the copyright holder. In this respect, 
direct and source licensing can be distinguished. 
Direct licensing entails a license agreement directly established between a music 
user, a local TV station, a theater owner, or an Internet service provider and the copyright 
70 See, e.g., Sections IV(A-B) and VI of the AFJ2, supra note 57. 
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holder. 71 The licensor is typically compensated with a one time, flat license fee, thereby 
saving the licensee from future obligations to pay performance royalties on a continuous 
basis. Direct licensing is rarely done in today's far-flung global media broadcasting 
society. It is impractical for public performers like theater owners, local TV stations, 
Web broadcasters, etc. to track down every individual songwriter or music publisher 
whose musical works are contained in the to-be-exhibited or to-be-broadcast film or 
program and negotiate a public performance license individually with each of them.72 
Direct licensing provides music users with no realistic alternative to the current range of 
public performance licenses offered by the PRSS.73 
A more practical, but also rarely chosen, way to avoid obtaining and having to 
pay for PRS licenses is called "source" licensing or licensing "at the source." In this 
scenario, public performers do not directly deal with copyright owners about licensing 
their public performance rights. Instead, the negotiations are conducted between the 
music users on one side, and film producers, film studios, or other media content 
providers on the other side. These content providers first obtain public performance 
licenses from the individual copyright owners together with a bundle of other rights, 
synchronization rights, master use rights, etc., and then pass along these rights to the 
71 See, e.g., Einhorn, supra note 49, at 353; Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
72 See the discussions in National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 632-34, 635 
(D.C. 1991) (cable television) ("difficult and costly;" cited from id. at 632); Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. 
v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 289-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (local television) (''umeasonably impractical and 
expensive;" cited from id. at 290). See also Fujitani, supra note 26, at 107-13 (to the necessity and 
advantages of blanket licensing from a macro-economic perspective). 
73 See also the opposing view by Escalante, supra note 17, at 88, who, however, fails to recognize that the 
difficult, costly, and impractical direct licensing must be a real choice for potentiallicensees(!), not only for 
licensing artists. 
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music users.74 As in the direct licensing scenario, the copyright owners are usually 
compensated with a one time, flat license fee. 75 Source licensing is typically only 
practiced in situations, in which the PRSs cannot or are not allowed t076 provide public 
performers with the necessary public performance license. In the U.S. this is only the 
case in situations where a motion picture theater owner wants to exhibit a motion picture 
in his theater.77 This situation will be discussed in further detail under IV.B.1. In all 
other situations, filmmakers and other media producers regularly refuse to purchase and 
pay for public performance licenses "at the source" that they, as non-performers, do not 
need.78 Bruce Owen, BMI's former economist, testified in Buffalo Broadcasting that this 
kind of an arrangement would just drive up production costs at the source.79 In contrast, 
public performers such as TV stations are forced to seek a license directly from the 
copyright owner of the public performance right or to acquire the appropriate licenses 
from the PRSs. 
74 About "source" licensing in general, see Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 
282 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (local television); National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. 
Supp. 614,628-32 (D.C. 1991) (cable television); also Einhorn, supra note 49, at 353-54; Fujitani, supra 
note 26, at 119 n.89. 
75 Critical Escalante, supra note 17: "This would convert the "continuing" performance license into a "one 
time only" fee .... [This would] force ... copyright holders ... to give up the possibility of continuing royalties 
for a one-time charge." Cited from id. at 89. 
76 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (concerning motion picture 
theater exhibitions). 
77 Id. See also M. Witmark & Sons v. Jenson, 80 F.Supp. 843 (D.Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
M. Witrnark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949). 
78 See Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp 274, 293 n.42 (S.D.N.Y. 1982». See also 
Escalante, supra note 17, at 89. 
79 Id. 
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IV. Historical Attempts to Enforce Anti-Trust Law against the 
Blanket Licensing System 
A. Governmental Anti-Trust Court Actions 
For decades, the greatest area of concern for the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has been the practice of the PRSs of issuing blanket licenses 
for a pre-determined non-negotiable fee to music users. This practice has been 
challenged by the DOJ as price fixing,80 containing illegal tying arrangements81 intended 
to bundle and sell out the entire repertory of a PRS. Both price fixing and tying 
agreements can be regarded as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The following 
pages offer a closer look to the DOJ's historical challenges of the blanket licensing 
system and the resulting consent decrees with the PRSs. 
1. History of the Consent Decrees 
The DOJ first investigated allegations of anticompetitive conduct by ASCAP over 
80 years ago, some 10 years after ASCAP was formed. 82 The first complaint was filed in 
1934, but the government was granted a mid-trial continuance and never returned to the 
courtroom.83 In 1941, the United States charged that the blanket license, which was then 
the only license offered by ASCAP and BMI and granted only on an exclusive basis 
forbidding direct licensing from the music composers and publishers, was an unlawful 
80 See Davis, supra note 41, at 417-18. See also the references accompanying note 12. 
81 See the references accompanying note 14. 
82 See Marcus Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GED. L.J. 407, 427 n.91 (1941); 
also BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 
83 See United States v. ASCAP, Equity No. 78-388 (S.D.N.Y., filed August 30, 1934). For this complaint, 
see also Hillman, supra note 1, at 743; BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. 
v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 
772 F. Supp. 614,617 (D.C. 1991). 
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combination in restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that arbitrary 
prices were being charged as the result of an illegal copyright pool. 84 The government 
enjoined ASCAP from requiring exclusive licensing powers from the copyright owners 
of the musical works and it also required ASCAP to offer an alternative licensing 
mechanism.85 The case was finally settled by a consent decree, the Final Judgment (FJ) 
of 1941.86 
Following complaints relating to the television industry, successful private anti-
trust court actions against ASCAP by movie theaters,87 and a government challenge to 
ASCAP's arrangements with similar foreign PRSS,88 the FJ was re-debated and 
extensively amended in 1950 in the Amended Final Judgment (AFJ) of 1950.89 Under 
the AFJ, copyright owners of musical works may grant ASCAP only non-exclusive rights 
to license their musical works for public performances, thereby allowing music users an 
alternative way to obtain a public performance license.9o In addition, the AFJ orders and 
directs ASCAP to issue to any music user making written application, a non-exclusive 
84 See United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941. For the Final 
Judgment of 1941, see also annotations in BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1979); National Cable 
Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.C. 1991). See also Davis, supra note 41, at 
418,423-24; Einhorn, supra note 50, at 349; Fujitani, supra note 26, at 113-14; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 
189; Hillman, supra note 1, at 743; Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. See also the 
historical descriptions in Section II(B) of the Memorandum of the United States in Support of the Joint 
Motion to enter Second Amended Final Judgment (last visited May 29, 2005) <www.usdoLgov/ 
atr/cases/f6300/6395.htm> (hereinafter, "Memorandum in Support of the AFJ2"). 
85 Id. 
86 See FJ of 1941, supra note 84. 
87 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jenson, 80 
F.Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 
177F.2d515 (8th Cir. 1949). 
88 See the description in Section I of the Memorandum in Support of the AFJ2, supra note 86. 
89 Supra note 64. See also the commentaries by W. Michael Gamer, United States v. ASCAP: The 
Licensing Provisions of the Amended Final Judgment of 1950,23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 119, 122-23 
(1976); John Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Problem, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 
277 (1978); Hillman, supra note 1, at 744-46. 
90 See Sections IV(A), IV(B) and VI of the AFJ, supra note 64. See also the commentary by Hillman, 
supra note 1, at 744-45. See also National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 
617-18 (D.C. 1991). 
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license to publicly perfonn all ASCAP compositions on a per-program basis.91 ASCAP 
may not insist on the usual blanket license and the per-program license must offer the 
applicant a genuine economic choice between the per-program license and the usual 
blanket license.92 If ASCAP and a putative licensee are unable to agree on a blanket or 
per-program license fee within sixty days, the putative licensee may apply to the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (USDCSDNY) for a 
detennination of a reasonable fee (hereinafter, "rate court proceedings"), with ASCAP 
having the burden of proving reasonableness. 93 
The DO] forced BMI to enter into similar consent decrees. The original consent 
decree against BMI had been entered in 1941.94 It was superseded by a new consent 
decree entered in 1966 following a monopolization complaint filed in 1964.95 This new 
BMI Consent Decree was last modified in a court order by the USDCSDNY in 1994.96 
The ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees vary in some respects. The most notable 
difference is that the BMI Consent Decree does not contain provisions on the question 
whether BMI may only obtain non-exclusive rights from its members, allowing music 
users to license public perfonnance rights directly from the music composers and 
91 See Sections VII(B) and VII(C) of the APJ, supra note 64. See also the commentaries by Hillman, supra 
note 1, at 745; Davis, supra note 41, at 418; Einhorn, supra note 49, at 351; Fujitani, supra note 26, at 114, 
123; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 189. See also Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 617-18 (D.C. 
1991). 
92 See Section VII(B) of the AFJ, supra note 66. 
93 Id. Section IX. The USDCSDNY has so far never exercised its power to set reasonable fees. Instead, it 
has assumed the role of mediator. See Gamer, supra note 89, at 127-28; Cirace, supra note 89, at 303. See 
also Fujitani, supra note 26, at 115, 122-23; Hillman, supra note 1, at 745-46; Television Music License 
Committee, supra note 22; also Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 278 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
94 See United States v. BMI, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 56,096 (E.D.Wis. 1941). 
95 See United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
96 See United States v. BMI, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). For the 1994 
modifications, see also Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. 
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publishers.97 However, it has become clear over the years that music users "could secure 
direct licenses from BMI affiliates with the same ease or difficulty, as the case may be, as 
from ASCAP members.,,98 
2. Main Content of the current Consent Decrees 
In their most recent movement, the United States, represented by the DOJ, and 
ASCAP jointly moved the USDCSDNY to amend the AFJ once again in 2001 to its 
current version, the Second Amended Final Judgment (AFJ2) of 2001.99 A number of 
provisions of the AFJ had become outdated and overcome by changes in technology, 
particularly the Internet, while others had proven to be ambiguous or ineffective in 
practice. 100 
Today, the AFJ2 governs and regulates almost every aspect of ASCAP's licensing 
and various other concerns, such as tracking and controlling music uses, infonning music 
users or prospective music users upon request whether any musical work identified by 
title and writer is in the ASCAP repertory, and questions concerning membership 
enrollment. 101 The most significant modifications to the AFJ include: first, the AFJ2 
expands and clarifies ASCAP's obligation to offer certain types of music users, including 
Internet companies, genuine economic alternatives, namely per-program licenses to the 
usual blanket license. 102 Second, by explicitly prohibiting ASCAP from limiting its 
members' rights to license their compositions directly or in a bundled fonn through an 
97 See Fujitani, supra note 26, at 115-16. 
98 Cited from CBS v. AS CAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
99 Supra note 57. 
100 See Section III of the Memorandum in Support of the AFJ2, supra note 84. See also Television Music 
License Committee, supra note 22. 
101 See also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 142. 
102 See Section VIII of the AFJ2, supra note 57; also Section III of the Memorandum in Support of the 
AFJ2, supra note 84. See also Einhorn, supra note 49, at 351,361,368. 
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agent or a music library, a practice called collective licensing, the AFJ2 encourages direct 
competition between ASCAP and its members. 103 Third, the AFJ2 simplifies the rate 
court proceeding of the AFJ to facilitate expedited and less costly resolution of fee 
disputes between ASCAP and its music users.104 Fourth, the AFJ2 clarifies that 
provisions regulating per-program and through-to-the-viewer licenses apply also to 
online transmitters and online users, as well as to any other unanticipated industry that 
transmits and retransmits programs in a manner similar to syndicated TV programs. lOS 
The BMI Consent Decree is not as readable and well-structured as the AFJ2, but 
contains in essence, the same provisions securing for music users genuine economic 
aitematives l06 to the blanket license,107 avoiding double licensing of transmitters and 
retransmitters in through-to-the-viewer situations,108 and requiring that rate disputes be 
submitted to the rate court before the USDCSDNY. I09 
Due to its lack of monopoly power with a current market share of only about 2% 
of all public performance rights in the U.S., SESAC has so far not been subject to any 
anti-trust litigation. It has, however, voluntarily entered into an agreement with the 
TMLC,IIO a non-government organization covering pre-negotiated blanket license fees 
and per-program licenses for the local television industry. I I I 
103 See Section IV(B) of the AFJ2, supra note 57; also Section III of the Memorandum in Support of the 
AFJ2, supra note 84. See also Einhorn, supra note 49, at 366. 
104 See Section IX of the AFJ2, supra note 57; also Section III of the Memorandum in Support of the AFJ2, 
supra note 84. See also Einhorn, supra note 49, at 351,362-63. 
10 See Sections V and VII of the AFJ2, supra note 57; also Section III of the Memorandum in Support of 
the AFJ2, supra note 86. See also Einhorn, supra note 49, at 361,366-67. 
106 See in Article VIII(B) of the BMI Consent Decree, supra note 66. 
107 !d. Articles VIII and IX. 
108 Id. Article IX(A). 
109 These BMI rate court proceedings are exercised by a judge other than one to whom any action in an 
ASCAP rate court proceeding has been assigned. !d. Articles XIII and XIV. 
110 URL: www.televisionmusic.com. 
III See Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. See also the information contained under 
http://www.sesac.comllicensingjbroadcast licensing faq.html#sesacO (last visited May 29, 2005). 
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B. Private Anti-Trust Court Actions 
The consent decrees do not, of course, immunize ASCAP and BMI from private 
anti-trust court actions brought by persons or entities not parties to the proceedings that 
resulted in the consent decrees. Just as the government is not bound by private anti-trust 
litigation to which it is a stranger, so private parties, similarly situated, are not bound by 
any form of government litigation. 112 Despite the guarantees, regulations, and 
proceedings provided by the consent decrees, several groups of licensees remained 
dissatisfied with ASCAP's and BMI's licensing practices and filed anti-trust actions. The 
actions were based principally on the same anti-trust concerns (price fixing, tying 
arrangements, and bundling) that triggered the government actions. 
1. Motion Picture Theaters: Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) 
In the early years of filmmaking, during the "silent movie" era in the 1920s, the 
only music publicly performed in a motion picture theater was played live, usually by a 
piano or organ player accompanying the exhibition of the silent picture. \13 
Synchronization licenses were unheard of, since they were not needed for the production 
of the silent pictures. Theater owners originally refused to pay any royalties to ASCAP 
for the right to publicly perform the musical compositions during the exhibition. In 1923, 
112 See M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 849 (D.Minn. 1948); Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. 
United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961) (referring to Section 5 of the Clayton Act as a definitive legislative 
pronouncement that a government suit cannot be preclusive of private litigation, even though relating to the 
same subject matter); also United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (N.J. 1950); United States 
v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 27 F. Supp. 116 (Del. 1939); United States v. Radio Corporation, 3 F. 
Supp. 23 (Del. 1933); also BM! v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 
113 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); also Phillips, supra note 
26, at 40; Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. 
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however, after ASCAP brought a series of infringement actions against several theater 
owners, theater owners began to obtain ASCAP licenses and pay for something that was, 
unquestionably, a live public performance of copyrighted musical works. 1 14 After 1928 
when the "talkies" found their way into the theaters, ASCAP continued to license theater 
owners for the public performances of the musical works now contained and pre-recorded 
in the soundtrack of the exhibited films.lls When a motion picture theater exhibitor 
received a talking motion picture from a distributor, synchronization and master use 
rights needed to be and had already been cleared by the film producer prior to distribution 
for exhibition. However, the theater owner still needed a public performance license 
from ASCAP for the exhibition of pictures that contained musical works. 
After the legal struggles that followed in the early 1920s, AS CAP followed a 
rigorous licensing policy to ensure that every theater owner in the country was licensed 
by ASCAP and had to pay the blanket license fee imposed by ASCAP. In addition, 
music composers and publishers, by virtue of their membership agreements with ASCAP, 
were forbidden to license public performance rights directly to film producers. 116 
Moreover, they were required to condition the grant of synchronization licenses to film 
producers upon the public performance of the musical works in theaters having valid 
licenses from ASCAP or other PRSS. 117 An example of such a provision is published in 
Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Company and Buena Vista 
114 For the historic developments, see in particular Phillips, supra note 26, at 40; also Alden-Rochelle, Inc. 
v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888,891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
115 See in particular Television Music License Committee, supra note 22; Einhorn, supra note 49, at 355. 
116 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); M. Witmark & Sons v. 
Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 845-46 (D.Mino. 1948); CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133 (2nd Cir. 1977); also 
Fujitani, supra note 26, at 116; Escalante, supra note 17, at 77. See also Section I1(B) of the Memorandum 
in Support of the AFJ2, supra note 84. 
117 See, e.g., Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. AS CAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); M. Witmark & Sons 
v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 844-45, 847 (D.Mino. 1948); CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133 (2nd Cir. 






Home Video,ll8 whereby Disney signed a 1939 license agreement with Stravinsky in 
order to obtain the composer's authorization to use his composition, "The Rite of 
Spring," in a motion picture. The provision was worded as follows: The license to the 
work "is limited to the use of the musical composition in synchronism or timed-relation 
with the motion picture .... The right to record the musical composition as covered by this 
agreement is conditioned upon the performance of the musical work in theatres having 
valid licenses from the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, or any 
other performing rights society having jurisdiction in the territory in which the said 
musical composition is performed.,,119 Theater owners that were not licensed by ASCAP 
for their public performances and that refused to acquire such license in the future were, 
therefore, unable to enter into any form of exhibition agreement with film producers or 
distributors. 
This licensing scenario constituted violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act for two reasons: First, ASCAP's membership agreements provided ASCAP with 
exclusive licensing power with respect to its members' public performance rights. 
Absent any licensing alternatives available on the market, AS CAP could use its 
bargaining power to fix and increase public performance license fees upon its discretion 
without having to look at alternative pricing and business policies of market competitors. 
Second, ASCAP extended its exclusive licensing power into third party negotiations in 
that it required its members to condition synchronization licenses to film producers and 
118 145 F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
119 [d. at 484. See also the comment to this decision by Susan S. Blaha, Case Summary: Boosey & Hawkes 
Music Publishing, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Co. 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998), 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & 
ENT. L. 449 (1999). A similar provision is published in M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 
(D.Minn. 1948): "The right to perform said musical composition as covered by this agreement is 
conditioned upon the performance of said musical composition in theatres having valid licenses from the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, or any other performing rights society having 
jurisdiction in the territory in which said musical composition is performed." Cited from id. at 844-45. 
27 
distributors upon the public perfonnance of the respective musical work in theaters 
having valid licenses from ASCAP or other PRSs. Theater owners were, therefore, not 
only confronted with ASCAP's exclusive licensing power when they were dealing with 
ASCAP about public perfonnance rights, but also when they were negotiating exhibition 
agreements with film producers and distributors. 
In 1942, a group of 164 theater owners brought suit against ASCAP claiming anti-
trust law violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Shennan Act. 120 The case was finally tried 
in 1948 against the backdrop of ASCAP's August 1947 attempt to increase the license 
fees for theater owners as much as 200% to 1500%.121 This blatant abuse of ASCAP's 
exclusive price fixing power in the middle of ongoing anti-trust proceedings against it 
may have been the decisive mistake that is hurting ASCAP and the other PRSs up to this 
day. The USDCSDNY held that almost every part of the ASCAP structure and almost all 
of ASCAP's activities in licensing motion picture theaters involved per se violations of 
the provisions of the Shennan Act. 122 The bundling of ASCAP's members' nondramatic 
public perfonnance rights was held to constitute both an unlawful combination in 
restraint of trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Shennan Act123 and an 
abuse of ASCAP's monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the Shennan ACt. 124 The 
USDCSDNY enjoined ASCAP from licensing and obtaining the public perfonnance 
rights of any musical composition synchronized with motion picture films when such 
musical composition is publicly perfonned through the exhibition of such motion picture 
120 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also the similarly 
situated case M. Witmark & Sons v. Jenson, 80 F.Supp. 843 (D.Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949). 
121 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 895, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
122 rd. at 893, 895. 
123Id. at 894-95. 
124 Id. at 893-94. 
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films in a theater. 125 Further, the USDCSDNY enjoined ASCAP's members (1) from 
refusing to grant to film producers the right to publicly perform through the exhibition of 
motion picture film in theaters, all musical compositions which they allow film producers 
to synchronize with motion picture film, and (2) from licensing, except to film producers, 
the right of public performance through the exhibition of motion picture films in theaters, 
of musical compositions synchronized with motion picture films.126 The USDCSDNY 
pointed out that although each member of ASCAP is granted by copyright law a 
monopoly in the copyrighted work, it is unlawful for the owners of a number of 
copyrighted works to combine their copyrights by any agreement or arrangement in 
violation of the anti-trust laws, even if it better preserves their property rights. 127 
The USDCSDNY's ruling effectively meant that theater owners would not need 
an ASCAP license for their movie exhibitions. It was up to the film producers to acquire 
public performance licenses at the source simultaneously with the synchronization rights 
to the music. The license fees for the public performance licenses were included in the 
film budget and treated as part of the production costs of the film company and were, 
consequently, not passed along to the theater owners together with the acquired 
synchronization and public performance rights. This practice has not changed up to this 
day. It leads to a situation that allows theater owners to publicly perform musical works 
125 Id. at 900 n.2. Section IV(E) of the AFJ2, supra note 57, is based on this part of the holding. No such 
provision is contained in the current BMI Consent Decree, supra note 66. See also Phillips, supra note 26, 
at 40; Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. 
126 Id. at 900 n.2. See also Phillips, supra note 26, at 40; Television Music License Committee, supra note 
22. 
127 Id. at 893. 
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contained in motion pictures without having to pay for it. This situation, therefore, is 
widely criticized by many scholars and music experts. 128 
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC have never challenged the reasoning of the Alden-
Rochelle decision,129 despite the fact that the music licensing industry has changed 
significantly over the last six decades. The arrangements of the 1930s and 1940s as 
contained, for example, in the Stravinsky case on pp. 26-27 have vanished from today's 
music licensing world. They also find no resemblance in any of the other present 
licensing arrangements with other audiovisual or non-audiovisual music users. Even 
more importantly, the current consent decrees enjoin and restrain ASCAP and BMI from 
exercising exclusive licensing powers over the copyright owners' public performance 
rights, thereby secunng competition regarding these rights with other non-exclusive 
market alternatives.13o Copyright owners may, for example, use the services of licensing 
agents to effectively license their public performance rights to others. 131 
Foreign legal systems, without exception, have never had anti-trust concerns in 
allowing their PRSs to charge theater owners for public performances of musical works 
contained in the motion pictures they exhibit. 132 The fact that motion picture theaters in 
the U.S. do not pay PRSs for the right to publicly perform synchronized film music may 
even present negotiating problems for the U.S. PRSs when dealing with their foreign 
128 See, e.g., PASSMAN, supra note 39: "no logical reason for this;" "nonsense." Cited from id. at 222. See 
also JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC, MONEY, AND SUCCESS: THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO 
MAKING MONEY IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 219-20 (2004); Phillips, supra note 26, at 40. 
129 See, e.g., BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 128, at 219; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 228; 
also National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 620 n.12 (D.C. 1991). 
130 See, e.g., Sections IV(A) and IV(B) of the AFJ2, supra note 57, and Article IV(A) of the BMI Consent 
Decree, supra note 66. 
131 See, e.g., Section IV(B) of the AFJ2, supra note 57. 
132 See, e.g., PASSMAN, supra note 39, at 222; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 16, at 228-29,233-34. 
Foreign PRSs usually collect theatrical public performance fees as a percentage of each theater's net box 
office receipts or as a per seat charge for the number of seats in each theater the motion picture is exhibited. 
See BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 128, at 177-78,204-05,218-220; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra 





counterparts.133 Since the foreign PRSs collect foreign theatrical performance royalties 
on behalf of their U.S. counterparts pursuant to their bi-Iateral agreements with ASCAP, 
BMI, and SESAC, et non vice versa, foreign PRSs may have a good argument in seeking 
some form of compensation in future re-negotiations of these bi-Iateral agreements when 
negotiating about the allocation of collection cost of performance royalties in other 
respects, such as for public performances on the Internet or other new media. 
The Alden-Rochelle decision was at the time when it was pronounced (1948) 
necessary to strip ASCAP of its exclusive licensing power that it had exercised over the 
public performance rights of its members in the area of theatrical motion picture 
exhibitions. It gave the DOJ a good reason to amend the FJ of 1941 and to include 
provisions in the AFJ of 1950, and later in the BMI Consent Decree of 1966, to enjoin 
ASCAP and BMI from holding, acquiring, licensing, enforcing, or negotiating public 
performance rights of musical works on any other than a non-exclusive basis.134 The 
Alden-Rochelle decision was, however, too restrictive in that it enjoined ASCAP in every 
respect from licensing theatrical public performance rights of musical works. To restrain 
ASCAP from licensing public performance rights on a non-exclusive basis went too far. 
It led to inconsistencies with the theatrical licensing situation in foreign territories. And 
even more importantly, it remained domestically unclear as to whether the U.S. courts 
were going to extend Alden-Rochelle to other areas of public performance licensing of 
musical works into audiovisual media. As of today, the U.S. courts have decided this 
question with respect to television networks (2.), local television stations (3.), and cably 
television (4.). 
133 See Phillips, supra note 26, at 40. 
134 See, e.g., Sections IV(A) and IV(B) of the AFJ2, supra note 57, and Article IV(A) of the BMI Consent 
Decree, supra note 66. 
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2. Television Networks 
It took a fairly long time until the blanket licensing system was challenged by one 
of the TV networks. Nineteen years after the AFJ and three years after the BMI Consent 
Decree, CBS, then the "giant of the world in the use of music rights,,,135 decided to file in 
a lawsuit on December 31, 1969, the last day CBS was covered by a valid BMI license,136 
against both AS CAP and BMI, as well as their affiliated members.137 The case ended 
almost twelve years later, after the final rehearing was denied by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 138 
a. District Court: CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
CBS claimed before the USDCSDNY that the blanket license format 
unreasonably restrained interstate trade and commerce in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act through price fixing, tying, and bundling of music compositions, a 
concerted refusal to deal, and monopolization.139 Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act 
(15 U.S.C. § 26), CBS sought to enjoin the two PRSs from issuing blanket and per-
program licenses, and in the alternative, asked the court to require the PRSs to offer a 
licensing format on terms proportionate to CBS's actual, rather than potential, use of 
music. 140 
135 Cited from CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
136 See CBS v. ASCAP, 320 F. Supp. 389,391 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
137 Id. The CBS case is annotated by Hillman, supra note 1, at 746-52; Einhorn, supra note 49, at 357-58; 
Fujitani, supra note 26, at 117-19; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 190-96; Television Music License Committee, 
supra note 22. See also the annotations in Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 
285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
138 See CBS v. ASCAP, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981). 
139 See CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
140 Id. 
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CBS claimed that the blanket and per-program licenses offered by ASCAP and 
BMI constitute a per se violation of the anti-trust laws. 141 On the issue of price fixing, 
CBS argued that ASCAP's and BMI's members avoided price competition among 
themselves and that the pooling of compositions in ASCAP's and BMI's repertory 
enabled the PRSs to fix the price that CBS and other music users must pay in order to 
obtain public performance rights. 142 CBS also asserted that the blanket license format 
constitute a per se illegal tying and bundling of wanted and unwanted musical 
compositions because it had to acquire, along with some desired compositions, works that 
it did not need and would not use for its programming.143 In addition, CBS argued that 
the purpose of blanket licensing to pool all compositions of ASCAP's or BMI's repertory 
into one license amounted to a concerted refusal by the members of ASCAP and BMI to 
deal directly with CBS with respect to their individual musical compositions. 144 
After almost six years of litigation and an eight-week trial on the merits, the 
USDCSDNY resolved all issues favorably to ASCAP and BMI. The USDCSDNY 
disagreed with CBS that the blanket licensing system constituted a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. It reasoned that ASCAP and BMI are both regulated by consent decrees. 
CBS had made no claim that either ASCAP or BMI had violated any provision of the 
consent decrees. Their terms did not in any way suggest that CBS was compelled to take 
a blanket license. On the contrary, ASCAP and BMI were required to offer per-program 
licenses under which a fee is charged only with respect to programs in which a 
composition within the repertory has been performed; and to structure the fees for blanket 
141Id. at 746. 
142 Id. at 745-48. 
143Id. at 745. 








and per-program licenses so that the user has a genuine choice between them. 145 Apart 
from the licenses available from ASCAP and BMI, the consent decrees leave a music 
user free to obtain licenses directly from copyright owners. 146 
The USDCSDNY, therefore, applied a rule of reason test to analyze ASCAP's 
and BMI's blanket and per-program licensing system. The USDCSDNY held, first, that 
CBS had failed to prove an illegal combination designed to fix prices in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman ACt. 147 Because the AFJ and the BMI Consent Decree 
guaranteed to music users the option of direct licensing and CBS had failed to disprove 
the viability of such an approach, CBS had only alleged and failed to prove that 
ASCAP's and BMI's members would not compete against each other if approached 
directly by CBS. 148 The USDCSDNY found that in view of CBS's enormous own 
market power, if CBS had requested music licenses directly from the copyright owners, 
"copyright owners would line up at CBS' door.,,149 Second, the USDCSDNY rejected 
CBS's tying and bundling claim on the same basis as the first one. CBS was not forced 
to purchase an unwanted package of partially useless compositions, because it failed to 
prove that it could not purchase the individual compositions contained in the package 
directly from ASCAP's and BMI's members. 150 Third, the USDCSDNY found that CBS 
had failed to offer any evidence that the individual composers had acted in a concerted 
effort to refuse to deal with CBS by prohibiting competition among themselves through 
the blanket licensing format. 151 And lastly, the USDCSDNY rejected CBS's claim that 
145 Id. at 749. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 746. 
148 Id. at 767-70. 
149 I d. at 768. 
150 Id. at 742, 748-49, 781. 










ASCAP and BMI had attempted and achieved a monopoly in the relevant market. 152 The 
court defined the relevant product market more broadly than CBS. The court defined the 
market as "performance rights to compositions suitable for television network use" 
whereas CBS defined it as "the market for BMI and ASCAP blanket licenses.,,153 The 
court could therefore include in its market analysis licenses that could be directly 
acquired from the individual copyright holders. Because the PRSs could not control price 
or eliminate competition in such a broadly defined market, they could not be regarded as 
having monopolized or attempted to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in 
violation of Section 2 ofthe Sherman Act. 154 
The USDCSDNY was right to apply the rule of reason standard. A per-se price 
fixing, and a per-se tying and bundling of wanted and unwanted musical compositions 
did not occur because CBS had viable alternatives to acquire public performance licenses 
from other sources at a different price. CBS could have avoided the acquisition of 
blanket licenses, if it had, for example, acquired direct licenses for certain of its programs 
and per-program licenses for its other programs. CBS, however, preferred to acquire 
blanket licenses because they could offer CBS a convenient way of covering all of its 
programs with one single license. The blanket license did not do more than offer CBS a 
market alternative, a bundled product, offered at a certain price. 
Notably, the USDCSDNY did not mention in the CBS case its per-se ruling of 
Alden-Rochelle with a single word. It missed a great chance to distinguish the situation 
present in Alden-Rochelle from the CBS case. The times had changed significantly. In 
1948, ASCAP had still exerted exclusive licensing power over its members' public 
152Id. at 782-83. 
153 Citations from id. at 782. 





performance rights. This excluded direct licensing from the copyright owners of the 
musical works. Until 1950, per-program licenses were not offered to music users at all. 
Both the AFJ of 1950 and the BMI Consent Decree of 1966 had done a great job in 
providing music users genuine market alternatives for their licensing needs. As long as 
AS CAP and BMI followed these decrees, they could not be reasonably held liable by the 
courts for aper-se violation of the Sherman Act. However, CBS appealed. 
b. Court of Appeals: CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1977) 
After almost two years, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed, holding that ASCAP's and BMI's blanket license was a per se violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 155 In an opinion "elegant in its simplicity,,,156 the appellate 
court based its reversal solely on CBS's price fixing claim. When sellers agree to sell 
collectively at a set price, they implicitly agree with each other not to compete on 
price. 157 When the price for the collective product or service includes compensation for 
someone whose products or services are not consumed, the consumer has most likely 
paid too much. 158 The pooling arrangement of the blanket licensing scheme therefore 
"fixes" some fee for each pool member, regardless of whether his compositions are used 
by each individual licensee. 159 To the appellate court, such a market structure was an 
intolerable affront to the free market. 160 
155 See CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2Dd Cir. 1977). 
156 Cited from Hillman, supra note 1, at 749. 
157 See CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 135-39 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
158 [d. at 135-36. See also Hillman, supra note 1, at 750. 
159 [d. at 135-36. 
160 [d. at 136. See also Hillman, supra note 1, at 750. 
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The appellate court rejected ASCAP's argument that because the blanket license 
offered only a new product, unlimited access to ASCAP's repertory of music, in addition 
to direct licensing from each copyright owner, the price setting associated with the 
blanket licensing format was not a restraint of interstate trade and commerce. 161 In the 
view of the court, the blanket licensing format was in compliance with Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act only if the free market failed to provide a mechanism to set a fair price on 
its own. 162 But, paradoxically, since direct licensing was still an alternative for CBS, it 
could be relied upon to set a fair market price. 163 
The per-se ruling of the appellate court avoided any clear analysis of the issues 
present in this case. The court did not explain how ASCAP and BMI could have per se 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, when they were at the same time in compliance 
with the consent decrees. As mentioned earlier, ASCAP and BMI had lost their price 
fixing power because the consent decrees provided that direct licenses and per-program 
licenses could be obtained by music users at different prices. The court was mistaken in 
ruling that only if all other market alternatives had failed to provide a mechanism to set a 
fair price on its own, it would have avoided a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Quite to the contrary, a per se price fixing of ASCAP and BMI in violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act could reasonably not occur as long as other market alternatives were 
able to provide such a fair price setting mechanism. The DOJ therefore disagreed with 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
161 !d. at 139-40. 
162 !d. at 136, 140. See also Hillman, supra note 1, at 750. 
163Id. 
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c. u.s. Supreme Court: BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) 
Supported by an amicus brief from the DOl urging the reversal of the appellate 
court's decision,164 AS CAP and BMI appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1979.165 The DOl referred in its amicus brief in the present case to an 
amicus brief, which it had submitted to the Supreme Court in an earlier case166 
concerning the ASCAP blanket licensing of radio stations, in which it said: "The 
Sherman Act has always been discriminatingly applied in the light of economic realities. 
There are situations in which competitors have been permitted to form joint selling 
agencies or other pooled activities, subject to strict limitations under the antitrust laws to 
guarantee against abuse of the collective power thus created ... This case appears to us to 
involve such a situation. The extraordinary number of users spread across the land, the 
ease with which a performance may be broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted 
compositions, the enormous quantity of separate performances each year, the 
impracticability of negotiating individual licenses for each composition, and the 
ephemeral nature of each performance all combine to create unique market conditions for 
performance rights to recorded music.,,167 The amicus brief submitted by the DOl in the 
CBS case remained of that view. 168 Furthermore, it disagreed with the appellate court in 
that it urged the Supreme Court that blanket licenses, which the AFl authorized ASCAP 
to issue to television networks, were not per se violations of the Sherman ACt. 169 The 
164 See BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,7, 14-15 (1979). 
165 [d. 
166 K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). 
167 [d. at 10. 







DO] took no position, however, on whether the practice is an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in the context of the network television industry. 170 
Following the DOl's submission, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate 
court's decision. l7l It remanded the case to the same appellate court for an application of 
the rule of reason, a determination of whether blanket licensing represented an 
unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce under the Sherman Act, holding 
that blanket licensing was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 172 
The Supreme Court rejected in particular the simplicity of the appellate court's 
decision. The complexity and uniqueness of the market, coupled with the passage of 
time, compelled the conclusion that only the use of the fact-sensitive, careful, balancing 
approach of rule of reason analysis would insure the proper result. I73 The per-se 
approach that developed mainly out of a judicial need for time-saving mechanisms in 
plainly anti-competitive cases provided the wrong recipe in cases where the Court lacked 
the experience with the ever-changing music licensing industry necessary to brand the 
PRSs' activity a per se violation of the antitrust laws. I74 Determining "price-fixing" is 
not a literal exercise but a conclusion reached "only after considerable experience with 
certain business relationships.,,175 The Supreme Court quoted from the appellate court's 
decision in which the appellate court had stated that "[in] dealing with performing rights 
in the music industry we confront conditions both in copyright law and in antitrust law 
which are sui generis.,,176 The proper inquiry under the rule of reason analysis must 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 25. 
172 Id. at 7, 24-25. 
173 Id. at 24. 
174 Id. at 8-10. 
175 Id. at 9 (citing from United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-608 (1972)). 
176 Id. at 10 (citing from CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130,132 (2od Cir. 1977)). 
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focus on whether the effect of blanket licensing is designed to "increase economiC 
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.,,177 In this context, the 
blanket license is not a "naked [restraint] of trade with no purpose except stifling of 
competition." 178 
The Supreme Court also rejected the appellate court's view that a blanket license 
does not amount to a new different product for music users in addition to licenses directly 
acquirable from the copyright owners. 179 The Supreme Court stated that "[h]ere, the 
whole is truly more than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different prodUCt.',180 
The Supreme Court viewed AS CAP not as "a joint sales agency offering the individual 
goods of many sellers" but rather as a "separate seller" offering the blanket and per-
program license as a new product whose "raw material" is the copyrighted compositions 
of ASCAP's members. 181 Since the blanket license is a product separate from the 
individual compositions, offered by different persons and entities on a different market 
level, it cannot adversely affect competition among individual copyright owners of the 
musical compositions.1 82 
The Supreme Court also recognized that ASCAP and BMI were each operating 
under consent decrees and constantly monitored and regulated by the DOl.183 Thus, 
177 Id. at 20 (citing from United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)). 
178 !d. (citing from White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)) (brackets in original). 




183Id. at 14-15, 24. 
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under the AFJ, 184 CBS had the option, which it failed to exerCIse, of asking the 
USDCSDNY to determine a reasonable fee for CBS's blanket license. 185 
On remand,186 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld 
ASCAP's and BMI's use of their respective blanket license systems under the rule of 
reason analysis. 187 With clear direction from the Supreme Court, the detailed decision of 
the USDCSDNY, and CBS's failure on appeal to challenge anything other that the 
district court's per se rulings, the appellate court could basically do nothing else than 
affirm the district court decision that it fonnerly had reversed. So, after more than a 
decade of litigation, ASCAP's and BMI's practice of issuing blanket and per-program 
licenses to TV networks was deemed legal under the Sherman Act by the courts. The 
decision is good law today. 
The Supreme Court decision in the CBS case became the point of reference for all 
future courts that had to judge ASCAP's and BMI's practice of licensing musical works 
into audiovisual media. The Alden-Rochelle decision by the USDCSDNY that the 
Supreme Court mentioned only one time in a footnote referring to the government's need 
in the late 1940s to reform the FJ of 1941,188 had lost its persuasive power once the AFJ 
of 1950 was decreed. From that moment on, Alden-Rochelle ran into conflict with the 
new licensing reality that emerged from the AFJ requirements. The AFJ, and later the 
BMI Consent Decree stripped AS CAP and BMI of their exclusive licensing powers. In 
addition to the now available direct and source licensing options, the decrees provided 
184 See Section IX of the AFJ, supra note 64, and the references to this Section accompanying note 93. The 
BMI Consent Decree, supra note 66, contained at the time no similar provision for judicial determination 
ofa reasonable fee. Such a provision was, however, added in 1994. See id. Article XIV. 
185 See BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,23-24 (1979). 
186 See CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981). 
187Id. at 939. 





music users with other genuine market alternatives, such as per-program licenses and 
"through-to-the-viewer" licenses that could be acquired instead of the regular blanket 
license. The Supreme Court decision in the CBS case made, therefore, clear that as long 
as ASCAP and BMI kept their licensing practice in compliance with the consent decrees, 
they could not be held liable by future courts for a per-se violation of the Sherman Act. 
In this way, oversimplified per se rulings such as the one by the appellate court in CBS v. 
AS CAP, 562 F.2d 130 (1977) could be avoided. Instead, future courts were mandated to 
apply the rule of reason test in all cases assuring a full-scale discussion about all pro-
competitive and anti-competitive aspects relevant to the parties. 
3. Local Television 
The first ASCAP licenses for local TV stations were granted in 1941.189 ASCAP 
initially offered free licenses for these stations.190 But in late 1948, due to the growing 
importance of television as a medium of mass communication and the rising revenue 
stream from an increasing number of new local TV stations, ASCAP notified the 
broadcasters that it was terminating the free licenses and demanded negotiations for a 
new fee-based blanket license based on each local TV station's annual net revenues. 191 
An agreement with the local TV stations was reached in 1949 setting the first blanket 
license fee rate at 12.25% of such revenues. 192 This was the beginning of a long, litigious 
189 See Television Music License Committee, supra note 22; also United States v. ASCAP, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2566, 1, 27. 
190 Id. 
191 See Television Music License Committee, supra note 22; also United States v. ASCAP, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2566, 1,28; United States v. ASCAP, 870 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. 
ASCAP, 157 F.R.D. 173, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
192 So-called "radio + 10"-rate. Radio broadcasters had negotiated a blanket license fee rate of 2.25% of 
each station's net revenue. The rate for the blanket TV license was supposed to become 10% higher. See 
Television Music License Committee, supra note 22; also United States v. ASCAP, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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relationship between the local TV stations and the PRSS. 193 In November 1978, five 
owners and operators of local TV stations initiated a class action against ASCAP, BMI 
and others. They represented the entire class of at the time about 450 owners and 
operators of about 750 local TV stations in the United States. 194 
a. District Court: Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
When the plaintiffs filed their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet 
reversed the Second Circuit ruling that ASCAP's and BMI's blanket license granted to 
the CBS network was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The claims 
brought forward in this class action, thus, mirror to some extent the claims of the CBS 
network in its action. The plaintiffs claimed that ASCAP and BMI had restrained, 
through the blanket licensing system, interstate trade and commerce of local TV stations 
in violation of Section I of the Sherman ACt. 195 The class action was limited to 
syndicated programming, excluding all network and locally-produced programming. l96 
The plaintiffs argued that the blanket licensing system in this area was "needless, 
anomalous, inefficient and coercive.,,197 To plaintiffs, the salient feature of ASCAP's 
and BMI's blanket licensing system was the splitting of the licensing of television public 
performance rights from the licensing of all other music rights at the source and the 
2566, 1,28; United States v. ASCAP, 157 F.R.D. 173, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The blanket license rates for 
local TV stations were significantly reduced in the upcoming years. See in particular Television Music 
License Committee, supra note 22; also United States v. ASCAP, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2566, 1,28-43. 
193 For a summary of the court history between local TV stations and the PRSs to a variety of issues (per-
program licenses, through-to-the-viewer licenses, rate disputes, etc.), see United States v. ASCAP, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2566, 1,28-43; also Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. 
194 See Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See the annotations 
by Kennedy, supra note 9, at 201-10; Hillman, supra note 1, at 752-56; Fujitani, supra note 26, at 119-20; 
Einhorn, supra note 49, at 358; Television Music License Committee, supra note 22. 
195 Id. at 285. 
196 Id. at. 279-81. 
197/d. at 285. 
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consequent absence of price competition between and among musical compositions.1 98 
The plaintiffs believed that the very existence of blanket licensing prohibited local TV 
stations from seeking reasonable alternatives to the existing blanket licensing scheme and 
that an injunction against blanket licensing would likely result in a form of source 
licensing directly from the producers of syndicated programming, who already would 
have obtained public performance rights licenses from the copyright owners.199 
By the time, the case was finally decided by the USDCSDNY, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had already reversed the Second Circuit ruling in the CBS case, mandating the rule 
of reason test for further legal applications.2oo Accordingly, the district court in this case 
felt bound by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, applying the rule of reason test, however, in 
the following two-pronged manner: First, the USDCSDNY considered whether 
realistically available alternatives to the blanket licensing format existed for local TV 
stations.201 Second, if it turned out that no realistically available alternatives to blanket 
licensing existed, the USDCSDNY analyzed according to the usual rule of reason test 
whether the anti-competitive effects of the blanket licensing format outweighed its pro-
competitive effects. 202 Answering the first prong in the negative,203 the USDCSDNY 
went on to hold, under the second prong, that the blanket licensing format constituted an 




200 Id. at 285-86. 
201 Id. at 286. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 292-93. 
204 Id. at 296. 
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The USDCSDNY first discussed and discounted three existing alternatives to the 
blanket licensing system: per-program licenses, direct licensing, and source licensing. 
The USDCSDNY reasoned that per-program licenses entailed too onerous reporting 
obligations, and its rates then were about seven times higher than the rates charged for 
blanket licenses. The USDCSDNY, thus, concluded that per-program licenses were 
neither time- nor cost-efficient and therefore not a realistic alternative to blanket 
licenses.205 The USDCSDNY came to the same conclusion with regard to direct 
licensing. Having to seek public performance rights licenses directly from thousands of 
individual copyright owners would be exorbitantly expensive and out of practical reasons 
virtually impossible to implement for local TV stations. Thus, it could not be regarded as 
a realistic alternative to the blanket licensing format. 206 Referring to the CBS case, the 
USDCSDNY pointed out that direct licensing may be a viable alternative for a powerful 
network like CBS but not for plaintiffs' local TV stations.z°7 The USDCSDNY also 
dismissed the notion that local TV stations would have the muscle to force producers of 
syndicated programming into source licensing arrangements.208 The USDCSDNY 
recognized that the producers of syndicated programming would not change to source 
licensing willingly without an injunction against blanket licensing.209 The USDCSDNY, 
consequently, concluded that none of the three alternatives to the blanket licensing 
scheme were realistically available to the local TV stations.2IO 
205 Id. at 288-89. 
206 Id. at 289-9l. 
207 Id. at 290-9l. 
208 Id. at 291-93. 
209 Id. 







With no realistic alternatives available to the local TV stations, the issue of the 
case turned, under the second prong, to the question of determining reasonableness. The 
USDCSDNY acknowledged that for small businesses that cannot anticipate their music 
needs, a market of blanket licenses was necessary, efficient, flexible, could allow 
unlimited use of an entire repertory for one fee, did not restrict output, reduced 
transaction costs, and could eliminate monitoring costs that would result under other 
licensing systems.211 Nevertheless, the USDCSDNY finally concluded these effects were 
not able to outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the blanket licensing scheme. In the 
USDCSDNY's view, the pooling of all compositions in one repertory prevents local TV 
stations from competing freely on the price for the public performances of each 
individual composition they want.212 Compositions administered by ASCAP or BMI do 
not compete within each society with one another. Local TV stations have no incentive 
to use new or little-known musical works because they can broadcast an established, 
famous song at the same COSt.213 The USDCSDNY considered these concerns as too 
fundamental not to regard the blanket licensing system as unreasonable under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act. The USDCSDNY therefore enjoined ASCAP's and BMI's blanket 
licensing practice with respect to syndicated programming for local TV stations in order 
to clear the way for the evolution of source licensing in this area.214 
The USDCSDNY's rule of reason analysis in this case is not convincing. It 
misses the Supreme Court's main point that the blanket license offers music users just a 
different product in addition to other market alternatives, such as per-program licenses, 
211Id. at 294-96. 
212Id. at 293. 
m Id. at 293-94. 
214Id. at 296. 
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direct and source licensing. The USDCSDNY itself acknowledged that for small 
businesses like local TV stations that cannot anticipate their music needs, the blanket 
license alternative was a necessary, efficient, and flexible means to reduce transaction 
costs, to eliminate monitoring costs that would result under other licensing systems, and 
to promote the use of music in general. Under the blanket license, every local TV station 
could pick and choose musical works upon their own discretion, famous songs as well as 
new or so far little-known works that still needed to be discovered. As the Supreme 
Court correctly stated, the blanket license is a product separate from the individual 
musical works, offered by a different competitor on a different market leve1.215 Thus, it 
cannot adversely affect competition among individual copyright owners of musical 
works. 
The USDCSDNY was already unconvincing in concluding that, under the first 
prong, direct and source licensing provided no realistic market alternatives to the blanket 
license for less powerful music users like local TV stations. Local TV stations could 
have used their existing market power to offer individual copyright owners or TV il, 
production companies a reasonable amount of money in order to obtain direct or source 
licenses. Since local TV stations covered with their syndicated and locally-produced 
programming only a smaller territory than the networks with their programming, the 
price for such licenses would have been significantly lower than the price for network 
direct and source licenses. And per-program licenses could have provided at least such 
TV stations an affordable alternative to the blanket license that needed music only for a 
limited number of their syndicated and locally-produced programming. ASCAP and 
BMI therefore appealed. 






b. Court of Appeals: Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1984) 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that 
the blanket licensing system does not restrain interstate trade and commerce in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because alternatives to the blanket licensing system in 
the form of per-program licenses, direct, and source licensing are realistically 
available.216 Since these alternatives precluded, as a matter of law, the conclusion that 
the blanket license was a restraint of interstate trade and commerce,217 no rule of reason 
analysis would be required. 
As to per-program licenses, the appellate court found that the transaction costs 
and the burdens involved in monitoring have not been shown to be excessive. The 
sevenfold price increase of per-program licenses was held not to be disproportionate 
because the respective per-program and blanket rates were based on different revenue 
bases.218 As to direct licensing, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that they lacked sufficient leverage to have the realistic chance to acquire licenses 
from the individual copyright owners, in particular because no evidence was offered that 
the local TV stations had attempted to obtain such licenses in the past and because they 
had been able to obtain such licenses for their own locally-produced programming.219 
Finally, as to source licensing, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that source licenses from producers of syndicated programming could not have 
been realistically acquired "by offering reasonable amounts of money,,220 to the 
producers. The appellate court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs had not presented 
216 See Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985). 
217 [d. at 933. 
218 [d. at 926. 





"evidence that the blanket license is functioning to restrain willing buyers and sellers 
from negotiating for the licensing of performing rights to individual compositions at 
reasonable prices.',zzl 
Although this appellate court's decision did not quite have the power and 
thoroughness of the CBS Supreme Court ruling, it made clear that ASCAP and BMI may 
continue in the future to issue blanket licenses not only to the TV networks, but also to 
local TV stations. Despite the regular rate disputes before the USDCSDNY, this is the 
situation today. 
4. Cable Television: National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. 
Supp. 614 (D.C. 1991) 
The blanket licensing system was also challenged by two cable TV networks and 
two trade associations representing cable TV networks and local cable TV system 
operators.222 After the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the CBS case and the Second 
Circuit's ruling in Buffalo Broadcasting, it was no surprise when the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia found BMI's blanket licensing system with 
respect to both cable TV networks and local cable TV stations in accordance with the 
. 1 223 antI-trust aws. As in Buffalo Broadcasting, the case was limited to questions 
concerning blanket licenses for syndicated programming.224 Following the reasoning in 
the Second Circuit decision in Buffalo Broadcasting, the district court found that realistic 
221 Id. at 932. 
222 See National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. BMI, 772 F. Supp. 614, 616-17 (D.C. 1991). 
223 Id. at 616. 






alternatives are available both for cable TV networks and for local cable TV stations.225 
Still, in view of a possible appeal by the parties, the district court wanted to decide the 
question of reasonableness at least on a hypothetical leve1.226 Its decision was never 
appealed by either party and remains unchallenged up to this day by the cable TV 
industry. 
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that there are no 
realistic alternatives to BMI's blanket licensing system available. As to source licensing, 
very few cable TV networks had ever attempted to obtain source licensing for syndicated 
programming.227 Those that did had not offered any additional money to obtain a public 
performance rights license.228 Nevertheless, source licensing had been obtained by HBO, 
and the Family Channe1.229 The plaintiffs therefore could not show a restraint created by 
the blanket licensing system impeding the alternative of source licensing music in 
syndicated programming.23o As to direct licensing, the court reached the same result with 
respect to cable TV networks.231 The plaintiffs failed to prove that direct licensing had 
been no viable alternative. HBO had not begun its direct licensing campaign until after 
BMI had filed the infringement suit against it. 232 In addition, music publishers like EMI 
had testified that they would grant direct licenses, for the right price. 233 In contrast, local 
cable TV system operators were contractually bound to transmit the cable network's 
syndicated programming simultaneously on receipt from the satellite, and without 
225 [d. at 628. 
226 [d. at 641-46. 
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interruption or editing.234 Moreover, they had little advance notice of the programming 
content, much less the music contained therein.235 The court, therefore, found that "these 
circumstances rendered direct licensing of cable operators cumbersome and ... 
unrealistic.,,236 As to per-program licenses, such licenses had been offered by BMI to 
every cable TV network that had asked for one.237 The plaintiffs failed to show that they 
had made any serious efforts to obtain per-program licenses in the past.238 Moreover, 
there was an absence of evidence that cable TV networks to whom BMI had offered per-
program licenses had ever seriously considered that option.239 In sum, the court 
concluded, there were realistic alternatives to the BMI blanket license available. For the 
cable TV networks per-program licenses, direct, and source licensing, and for the local 
cable TV stations at least source licensing. The BMI blanket license did, therefore, not 
constitute a restraint of interstate trade and commerce within the meaning of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. 240 
The court turned then hypothetically to the question of reasonableness.241 As to 
the anti-competitive effect of price fixing, the court found that the plaintiffs had not 
offered any concrete evidence as to how the price of public performance rights was 
inflated beyond what it would have been without the blanket licensing system. 242 The 
plaintiffs had not shown that the price of music public performance rights in syndicated 
programming would have been lower, or more competitive, if the blanket license had not 
234 [d. at 635. 
235 [d. 
236 Cited from id. 
237 [d. at 634. 
238 [d. 
239 [d. 
240 [d. at 634-35. 
241 [d. at 641-46. 





existed?43 To the contrary, the court found ample evidence that the blanket license 
increased output and encouraged the use of music by eliminating marginal costs once the 
music is purchased?44 As another pro-competitive effect, the court highlighted the 
tremendous efficiency of the blanket license, which, ultimately, had been able to reduce 
costs to buyers, and eliminate potentially thousands of transactions that would otherwise 
have had to occur in negotiating licenses, monitoring of use, sales, and enforcement of 
copyrights, auditing, and bookkeeping. 245 Moreover, blanket licensing was able to 
promote the goals of the copyright laws by protecting copyright owners from 
infringements by unauthorized users and by providing them compensation in exchange 
for the authorized use of their public performance rights.246 
Up to the present, the blanket licensing system has, therefore, survived all 
challenges through private anti-trust court actions with the single exception of the one 
challenge brought by motion picture theater owners in 1948. In view of the reasons that 
have been given by the courts in the meantime in favor of the blanket licensing system, it 
seems likely that the Alden-Rochelle decision as the current alien in the national and 
international legal arena will sooner or later be overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Due to the successful DOJ anti-trust court actions against ASCAP and resulting consent 
decrees, the distinguishing reason, in particular ASCAP's initial exclusive licensing 
power and its abusive licensing arrangements in the 1930s and 1940s, has disappeared. 
Since the AFJ of 1950, Alden-Rochelle, the only successful private anti-trust court action 
243 Id. 
244 [d. at 644. 
245 [d. 
246 [d. at 646. 
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against the blanket licensing system, has become vulnerable. Paradoxically, by securing 
genuine alternatives to the PRSs' blanket licensing scheme, such as per-program licenses, 
"through-to-the-viewer" licenses, direct and source licensing, the consent decrees have 
significantly contributed to its vulnerability. 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
1. There is a natural conflict between copyright law and anti-trust law. The 
Copyright Clause (Art I, § 8(8)) of the U.S. Constitution provides that "The Congress 
shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries." This exclusive right grants to authors a limited monopoly over their 
works of authorship for a limited amount of time that may be exploited according to the 
authors' discretion pursuant of the provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act. Anti-trust law, 
on the other hand, reflects an express policy against monopolies. Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act provides that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." And Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
provides that "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony ... " The conflict between copyright law and anti-trust law intensifies in the area of 







works generally pool these rights in PRSs which are designed to act as agents on their 
members' behalf. The issue is whether the PRSs' licensing system violates Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court applies these two sections 
of the Sherman Act under a rule of reason standard. Under this standard, reasonable 
market behavior that on balance of all pro-competitive and anti-competitive aspects 
relevant to a case does not hamper economic efficiency and competition in the free 
market does not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. However, the courts deem 
some plainly anti-competitive categories of business practices, such as price fixing, and 
tying and bundling agreements, as per se violations of the Sherman Act because they lack 
any redeeming virtue. 
2. Initially, ASCAP's membership agreement provided that AS CAP shall have the 
exclusive power to license its members' public performance rights to music users. This 
provision excluded direct and source licensing of public performance rights from 
individual copyright owners. ASCAP offered at the time only blanket licenses. 
ASCAP's exclusive licensing practice was successfully challenged by U.S. motion 
picture theater owners in Alden-Rochelle. The USDCSDNY judged ASCAP's blanket 
licensing system as a per se violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In its 
decision (1948), the USDCSDNY enjoined ASCAP from exclusively or non-exclusively 
licensing and obtaining the public performance rights of any musical composition 
synchronized with motion picture films when such musical composition is publicly 
performed through the exhibition of such motion picture films in a theater. ASCAP, 





3. The Alden-Rochelle decision practically invalidated the FJ of 1941 that still 
allowed ASCAP to exclusively license its members' public performance rights to music 
users. The AFJ of 1950, and later the BMI Consent Decree of 1966, stripped the PRSs of 
their exclusive licensing powers. In addition, the decrees required that ASCAP and BMI 
offer per-program licenses as a genuine alternative to the blanket license. Other types of 
licenses, such as "through-to-the-viewer" licenses also had to be offered by the PRSs. 
4. In the following years, the PRSs' blanket licensing system was challenged in 
other private anti-trust court actions. In 1969, CBS filed a lawsuit against ASCAP and 
BMI claiming per se violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In 1980, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided in this case that blanket licensing was not a per se violation 
of the Sherman Act and, instead, mandated a rule of reason analysis. In practice, the 
Supreme Court decision meant that the PRSs could not be regarded by future courts as . 
per se violators of the Sherman Act as long as the PRSs were in compliance with the 
provisions of the consent decrees. In Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917 
(1984), a case concerning local TV stations, the Second Circuit followed the CBS 
Supreme Court ruling, holding that the blanket licensing system was not in violation of 
the Sherman Act because alternatives to the blanket licensing system in the form of per-
program licenses, direct, and source licensing were realistically available. In 1991, the 
same result was reached in a district court ruling concerning challenges by cable TV 
networks and cable TV stations. 
5. The Alden-Rochelle per se ruling against ASCAP by the USDCSDNY was at 
the time necessary in that it divested ASCAP of its exclusive licensing power. In that 
sense, it was a ruling against the exclusive price fixing power that AS CAP had abusively 
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exerted in the 1930s and 1940s. Alden-Rochelle was too restrictive, however, in that it 
entirely precluded ASCAP from licensing motion picture theater owners. It had lost its 
persuasiveness, once the APJ of 1950 provided music users with viable market 
alternatives to the blanket license. In addition, Alden-Rochelle is today in open conflict 
with the CBS Supreme Court ruling of 1980. We want to predict Alden-Rochelle's likely 
fall upon its first challenge before the Supreme Court. Vladimir and Estragon will again 
have to wait a little while for Godot, but this time surely not in vain. 





"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which are 
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, 
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless 
of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are 
embodied. See Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Blanket license: 
The "blanket license" grants the licensee, for example a TV station or the operator of an 
Internet website, the right to ~ publicly perform any or all of the nondramatic musical 
works of the entire repertory of a ~ performing rights society (PRS) in all or parts of 
its programs as often as the licensee wants. It blankets the entire catalogue of musical 
works that can be licensed by the ~ PRS. 
Copies: 
"Copies" are material objects, other than ~ phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by 
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a ~ phonorecord, in 
which the work is first fixed. See Section 101 ofthe Copyright Act. 
Derivative works: 
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, ~ motion picture 
version, ~ sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work." See Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act. 
Direct licensing: 
"Direct licensing" refers to a license agreement directly established between a music 
user, a local TV station, a theater owner, or an Internet service provider and the current 
copyright holder ofthe ~ public performance rights of an individual musical work 
Display: 
To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, 
slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a ~ motion 
picture or other ~ audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially. See 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Master use right: 
The "master use right" is the right to reproduce (Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act) a 
copyrighted musical work as it is contained in a particular ~ sound recording or master 
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tape in timed relation with the visual or other aural aspects of any -7 motion picture, 
television program or other -7 audiovisual work. 
Motion pictures: 
"Motion pictures" are -7 audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images 
which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any. See Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Performance: 
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by 
means of any device or process or, in the case of a -7 motion picture or other -7 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds 
accompanying it audible. See Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Performing rights societies (PRSs): 
A "performing rights society" is an association, corporation, or other entity that licenses 
the -7 public performance of nondramatic musical works on behalf of copyright owners 
of such works, such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC, Inc. See Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act. 
Per-program license: 
The "per-program license" grants the licensee the right to -7 publicly perform any or all 
of the nondramatic musical works of the entire repertory of a -7 performing rights 
society (PRS) in certain programs as often as the licensee wants. It is similar to a -7 
blanket license in that it authorizes the licensee to use all of the musical works in the 
entire repertory of a -7 PRS. It differs, however, from the -7 blanket license in that the 
music repertory of the -7 PRS may be used only in certain programs of the licensee that 
are covered by the per-program license. 
Per-use license: 
The "per-use license" is another form of -7 blanket license that avoids the current 
wholesale gross-revenue oriented character of a -7 blanket license and to install instead 
a license fee system that is based on the actual nature and amount of each individual 
musical work -7 publicly performed. 
Phonorecords: 
"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a 
-7 motion picture or other -7 audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known 
or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 
"phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. See 




To ~ perform or ~ display a work "publicly" means -
(1) to ~ perform or ~ display it at a place open to the public or at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered; or 
(2) to ~ transmit or otherwise communicate a ~ performance or ~ display of 
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device 
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the ~ 
performance or ~ display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at 
the same time or at different times. 
See Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Sound recordings: 
"Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, 
or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a ~ motion picture or 
other ~ audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, 
tapes, or other ~ phonorecords, in which they are embodied. See Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act. 
Source licensing: 
Unlike in the ~ direct licensing scenario, "source licensing" refers to a practice in which 
the deal-making process is entirely controlled and finalized by non-performing film 
producers, film studios, or other media content providers. These entities acquire the ~ 
public performance rights to a musical work together with an entire bundle of other 
rights, ~ synchronization rights, ~ master use rights, etc. "at the source" and pass 
along these rights to the ~ publicly performing TV stations, theater owners, or other 
public media performers. 
Synchronization right: 
The "synchronization right" is the right to reproduce (Section 106(1) of the Copyright 
Act) a copyrighted musical work in timed relation or synchronization with the visual or 
other aural aspects of any ~ motion picture, television program or other ~ audiovisual 
work. 
Through-to-the-viewer license: 
The "through-to-the-viewer license" covers two or more ~ public performances of two 
or more different entities. The license is granted to a programming service, for example a 
TV network, that ~ transmits its programming or services to a local TV station (= first 
public performance) that then retransmits the programming or services to the final 
viewers (= second public performance). 
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Transmission: 
To "transmit" a ~ performance or ~ display is to communicate it by any device or 
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are 
sent. See Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Work made for hire: 
A ''work made for hire" is -
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work, as a part of a ~ motion picture or other ~ audiovisual work, as 
a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as 
a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made 
for hire. 
See Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was 
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights 
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